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ABSTRACT: The term emergence, or irreducibility, has been used in a great variety of 
senses over the years, and different senses are useful in different discursive contexts. 
In this paper the focus is on one specific context, that of methodologically oriented 
social theory, and the question to answer is, what might be the most useful sense(s) 
of emergent irreducibility in that field? To answer that question, key intuitions of 
emergence are first abstracted from the concept’s history. Three main senses of the 
term are distinguished based on those different intuitions. Then the likely linguistic 
functions of emergence in each of those main senses are gauged in social theory and 
methodology. It is argued that one of the senses – here called “contingently epistemo-
logical irreducibility” – is in fact more useful as regards social scientific methodology 
than the others.
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In philosophical parlance, calling something emergent most often implies that 
it is – in one sense or another – “irreducible” to its components.1 The gist 
of the issue then is: what does irreducibility mean? There is a great variety 
of answers to that question, the concept of emergence having been used in 
many distinct senses by different thinkers. And I do not believe in One Cor-
rect Definition of emergence, either – to take a pragmatic standpoint on the 
matter, as will be done here, a term’s meanings come down to how it can 
be meaningfully used in communication situations, and different senses of 
1 Even this characterization is sometimes questioned. Some say irreducibility is not es-
sential for emergence and insist we allow for (weak) forms of emergence that are compatible 
with reducibility (e.g. Bedau 1997; Chalmers 2006; Clayton 2006; Sawyer 2001). But in this 
article I focus on emergence as irreducibility.
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emergence are certainly useful in different situations, in different discursive 
contexts. Nevertheless, context-dependency is no excuse for not going into 
details of particular uses of words. Let us delimit our focus herein to social 
theory and, even more specifically, to its methodologically oriented dimen-
sion, and search for the most useful sense(s) of emergence in that particular 
context.
But we should begin with a short examination of the history of the emer-
gence concept overall, so as to pick out its most prominent senses, the ones 
firmly rooted in the main intuitions of emergent irreducibility. For, of course, 
we first need to know these different senses to be in a position to estimate 
their pragmatic usefulness in the field of methodological social theory.
1. On the History and Intuitions of Emergence
The most basic idea of emergent irreducibility, that of a whole sometimes 
being more than the sum of its parts, has a very long history – it was con-
sidered already by Plato (1952 / Theaetetus: 203e ff.) and Aristotle (1954 / 
Metaphysica: 1041b). The idea obviously carries metaphysical connotations 
and has been connected to any number of stratified worldviews throughout 
human history, to various interpretations of scala naturae – the “great chain of 
being” (Lovejoy 1936; see e.g. Smellie [1790] 1977). Often these worldviews 
have involved axiological convictions, too, as more prestigious or valuable 
creatures and things (gods and angels, kings and noblemen, higher life forms, 
etc.) typically reside higher up in the hierarchical pyramid of being than the 
less valuable ones (peasants and slaves, simple life forms, lifeless objects). And 
while it is by no means necessary for any particular epistemic problematic 
to be involved in the understanding of such a pyramid or chain of being, 
there have certainly always been religious and philosophical mystics perceiv-
ing the path to (qualitatively better, or true) knowledge as a sort of ladder to 
be climbed, as a progress to be made toward higher levels of understanding 
(involving perhaps moments of mysterious illumination), and that may be 
seen as an archaic form of the epistemic intuition of emergence.
But it was not until early twentieth century that the idea of several epis-
temic levels fused together with the idea of metaphysical pyramid of being 
where higher-level wholes are more than the sum of their parts. An important 
prelude to that development took place when some of the results of the then 
very rapidly progressing modern science – especially the many surprises and 
uncertainties encountered in chemistry – led J. S. Mill [1843] (1906: Bk. III. 
Ch. vi) to articulate the idea of “heterophatic laws,” which he distinguished 
from the straightforwardly mechanical causal laws on grounds that we pres-
ently cannot understand the effects of the processes captured only by heter-
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ophatic laws as simple sums of their components’ separate effects and thus 
cannot deduce them a priori from component-level knowledge.
Now this was an epistemological criterion, and one which allowed for 
optimism as regards future experience and progress in knowledge teaching us 
how to deduce (some) heterophatic laws from mechanical laws. Perhaps some 
of our heterophatic outcomes will be fully explained and predicted by the 
science of tomorrow: a heterophatic law may turn out to be derivable from 
the component-level laws in accordance with “laws of the generation of laws 
from others dissimilar from them,” and that would render science deductive 
(Mill [1843] 1906: Bk. III, Ch. vi, §2).2
Other empiricist thinkers, like Mill’s friend Alexander Bain and another 
prominent figure of the period G. H. Lewes, followed Mill’s lead in this 
matter, and Lewes was the first to coin the term “emergent” – meaning an 
outcome of a process so complicated that the exact role of each of its com-
ponents is currently unknown to us. Opposite to emergents were “result-
ants,” outcomes of processes simple enough for us to understand precisely, 
and Lewes, too, kept the faith that someday perhaps we will be able to turn 
many of the present-day emergents into resultants (by finding mathematical 
formulae that capture how they come about). (Lewes 1875: 412–414.) That 
sort of open-endedness of what will be emergent in the future is characteristic 
of this empiricist, let us say “contingently epistemological irreducibility” sense 
of emergence, which is tied to what we currently happen to know.
But the concept of emergence soon evolved further, and the early twenti-
eth century saw the contingently epistemological intuition of the nineteenth 
century empiricists become fused together with much more metaphysical 
emergence intuitions. Indeed, a brand new epistemological-cum-metaphysi-
cal emergence concept arose in the first decades of that century and had a 
real heyday in the 1920s, when writers like Samuel Alexander (1920), C. L. 
Morgan (1923) and C. D. Broad (1925) made use of it, embracing the idea 
that there is a hierarchy of levels of (descriptions of ) reality where each stra-
tum manifests new features logically irreducible to lower levels.3 For many of 
the emergentists of that period, a part of their motivation evidently stemmed 
from a wish to consolidate the new Darwinian worldview with older vitalistic, 
mentalistic or even theistic ideas. Alexander and Morgan in particular con-
jectured that the “pyramid of emergent evolution” embodies also some sort 
2 E. Nagel’s (1961) “bridge laws” later provided convenient shorthand for these Mill’s 
“laws of the generation of laws from others dissimilar from them.”
3 As these three celebrated emergentists of the 20s all lived and worked in Great Britain, 
the period is sometimes dubbed the heyday of British emergentism (McLaughlin 1992); but 
there were emergentists elsewhere, too, like Roy Wood Sellars (1922; 1926: Ch. xxiv) – father 
of the famous Wilfrid – in America. 
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of “deity.”4 But the epistemological-cum-metaphysical emergence concept as 
such was not theistic; Broad’s theory is arguably secular.5 It just fortifies the 
Millian notion of contemporary scientists’ de facto inability to deduce emer-
gents from their components with the postulate that such a deduction is 
impossible even in theory (see Broad 1925: 61).
Indeed, a major point concerning emergence in the 1920s is that it no 
longer meant just that it so happens (contingently) that we (scientists or hu-
man beings) are currently (but perhaps not in the future) unable to deduce 
emergents from their components; rather, even an “archangel” endowed with 
infinite computing powers would be unable to accomplish that (Broad 1925: 
70–71). Emergence became “even-in-principle irreducibility” – not just epis-
temological but also metaphysical irreducibility, albeit not in the sense of 
conception-independent metaphysics, it should be noted. As Simon Blackburn 
(1996) points out, there are at least two very different conceptions of meta-
physics: (i) contemplation of Reality as it ultimately is independently from 
how anybody ever conceives of it, and (ii) contemplation of how reality is 
conceived, investigation of the conceptual schemes made use of in under-
standing the world; and Broad’s metaphysics was of the second kind, not 
something independent from all thinking and experience, but a matter of 
conceptualized experience that can be scrutinized through logic. (That is why 
a claim that X logically cannot be known in terms of its components is, for 
Broad, a metaphysical commitment.)
The concept of emergence roughly in that Broadian sense aroused a lot 
of excitement throughout the Western philosophical circles in the early twen-
tieth century, until its popularity plummeted for a while around the middle 
of the century (see Stephan 1992: 26) – perhaps due to the upsurge in empir-
icist philosophy of science characteristic of the period. Namely, empiricism 
again encouraged purely epistemological interpretations of emergence as just 
limitations of our present knowledge and theories (Hempel & Oppenheim 
1948: 146–152; Nagel 1961: 366–374). But that trend was rather short-lived 
and the next wave of metaphysical emergentism started gaining momentum 
4 Morgan was also a known scientist and did suspect that deities do not go well to-
gether with scientific thinking; but he allowed himself to supplement his scientific treatise 
with “philosophic” speculations: “while I hold that the proper attitude of naturalism is strictly 
agnostic, therewith I, for one, cannot rest content,” he wrote: “I acknowledge God as the Nisus 
through whose Activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is di-
rected. Such is my philosophic creed, supplementary to my scientific policy of interpretation” 
(Morgan 1923: §6).
5 Geoffrey Hodgson (2004: 238–241) pictures Broad as a champion of non-religious 
emergence who “rescue[d] emergentist philosophy from theology.” However, even Broad (see 
1925: 514 ff.) was interested in paranormal research. Many metaphysical emergentists have 
in fact been of a “supernaturalist” bent, although there have certainly been secular ontological 
emergentists, too – Mario Bunge, John Searle and Hodgson himself, for example.
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in the 1970s – in concert with again growing interest in ontologically realist, 
as opposed to empiricist, philosophy of science.
By then there was a host of different interpretations of emergence 
around, for although the leading emergentists of the 70s, such as Karl Popper 
([1971] 1979; 1974; 1977), Roy Bhaskar ([1975] 2008; 1979; 1986) and 
Mario Bunge (1977; 1979a; 1979b), mostly conceived of emergence in an 
ontological sense, they differed greatly on specifics – not least because they 
had different concepts of ontology. Popper I think was closest to the Broad-
ian interpretation, emphasizing the even-in-principle irreducibility and un-
predictability of emergents, binding it together with conception-dependent 
stratified ontology (see Popper [1971] 1979: 153 ff.; 1974; 1977: 16 ff.). But 
Bunge, for instance, suspects that Popper’s emergence concept just confuses 
epistemology and ontology; Bunge himself championed a thoroughly on-
tological definition, separating emergent properties from all such epistemic 
considerations as unpredictability and sense of mystery (Bunge 2003: 12–14; 
also e.g. Mahner & Bunge 1997: 29–30). And Bhaskar’s emergence, in turn, 
is arguably a hybrid of these themes – for on the one hand he too criticizes 
Popper for not paying sufficient attention to (“intransitive,” i.e. mind-inde-
pendent) ontology (Bhaskar 2002: 14–15; Outhwaite 1987: 29–30, 36; Pot-
ter & López 2001: 6–7), but on the other hand he often speaks of ontological 
emergence as something intimately tied to the fact that we (seem) unable to 
deduce and predict the higher-level features from the lower-level laws (see 
Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 112–117; 1986: 104 and note 1a, 113–114).6
Bunge’s theory perhaps best exemplifies what may be called the “purely 
ontological irreducibility” interpretation of emergence. According to Bunge, it 
is perfectly possible for us to understand an emergent, to know exactly how 
it arises, while it still remains emergent because “explained emergence is no 
mere resultant.” In fact, “[e]ven modest accretion processes can ensue in sys-
tems possessing emergent properties.” So the process of emergence need not 
be complicated even in our eyes, to say nothing of the eyes of an archangel, 
it need not have any air of mystery about it. Actually, every chemical reaction 
produces emergent outcomes, and even the breakdown of a system, or the 
substitution of some of its parts by others, are emergent processes (Bunge 
1979a: xiii, 30). Emergence for Bunge is so purely an ontological notion 
that it is almost trivial: in no way does the fact that a property P is emergent 
signify even the slightest ignorance on our part of the underlying compo-
nent-level mechanisms producing P, because all it takes for P to be emergent 
6 There is some ambiguity in Bhaskar’s ontology (Cruickshank 2004), yes, and some 
recent ontological emergentists see this as a reason to prefer Bunge’s, or perhaps Wimsatt’s 
(2003), emergentism to that of Bhaskar’s (Kaidesoja 2009; Le Boutillier 2013). But Bhaskar 
has certainly had his share of following, too (Potter & López 2001; see also e.g. Outhwaite 
1987; Collier 1994; Archer 1995; Lawson 1997). 
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is that it is a property of a whole but not a property of its parts (Mahner & 
Bunge 1997: 29).
2. Taking Stock – the Main Senses of Emergence
Many theorists have elaborated and redefined the concept of emergence over 
the years to serve their own purposes, turning it into a vague chimera concept 
(see O’Connor & Wong 2012). Today, all the different senses of emergence 
have little if anything in common. Nevertheless, the historical survey in the 
preceding section brought out a couple of intuitions of emergence that seem 
more outstanding or central than the others, so while there are numerous dif-
ferent interpretations of the term around, perhaps all the more plausible ones 
might be conceived of as expressing or combining this handful of different 
intuitions. Indeed, I suggest our analysis of emergence can go a long way by 
distinguishing (1) the traditional empiricist intuition of contingently episte-
mological irreducibility, the idea that things are emergent precisely insofar as 
the relevant (scientific) community today acknowledges that it is presently 
unknown to us how exactly they could be epistemically reduced to their com-
ponents; (2) the intuition of emergence as even-in-principle irreducibility, the 
strong epistemic ideal tied to conceptualization-dependent metaphysics; and 
(3) the intuition of standpoint-, context- and conceptualization-independ-
ent, purely ontological irreducibility, the intuition that the world consists of 
sui generis strata no matter what anybody thinks or knows about it.
All the rest of the gamut of emergence conceptualizations that we find in 
philosophy and science today is due to different thinkers relying on different 
conceptions of knowledge, ontology or reducibility, as well as their different 
ways of combining the three basic intuitions. Meanwhile, beneath the surface 
variety of emergentisms, all three basic intuitions are still doing well today 
– each is given pride of place by some discussants. Indeed, first, there are 
thinkers who have adopted a Millian or Hempelian stance and allow emer-
gence only in a purely epistemological and contingent sense (see e.g. Dennett 
2005: 3–7; Hedström 2005: 74–75; Pleasants 1999: 111–112; cf. also Fuchs 
2001: 199–201); second, others still defend a strikingly Broadian or Pop-
perian version of emergence, even-in-principle irreducibility stemming from 
the disparities between different levels of conceptualization (e.g. El-Hani & 
Pereira 2000: esp. 119 and note 2; McIntyre 2007; Sawyer 2001: esp. 555–
558, 564–572; see also Searle 1992: Ch. 5);7 and third, there are also many 
7 Searle calls his view ontological, but he is not speaking of conceptualization-independ-
ent ontology and emergents. Rather, he is saying that given the way reality is conceptualized, 
there is at least one emergent feature – consciousness – which, “by definition, is excluded from 
a certain pattern of reduction” (Searle 1992: 122 [emphasis added]). Indeed, the contrast 
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who understand emergence in a Bungean or Bhaskarian vein – as a mainly 
or even purely ontological, conceptualization-independent matter which has 
little or nothing to do with what anybody knows about anything (e.g. Em-
meche, Køppe & Stjernfelt 1997: esp. 83–85, 105–106, 117; Silberstein & 
McGeever 1999; Elder-Vass 2007: 28–32, 38–40; cf. also Holland 1998).
I think it is important to be aware of these three basic intuitions. Thus I 
cannot really recommend any of the much more common dichotomous analy-
ses, separating only “strong” and “weak” forms of emergence; those analyses 
simply lose sight of one or another of the three main senses of emergence. 
Indeed, that is why the dichotomy of “strong vs. weak” emergence is not 
one dichotomy but several: these dichotomies differ from each other pre-
cisely with respect to which intuition they disregard. For instance, the usual 
juxtaposition is between ontological and epistemological emergence, but 
this leaves room for two very different interpretations of the epistemological 
side: some conceive of it as even-in-principle irreducibility (McIntyre 2007: 
339–342), whereas others think of it as contingently epistemological irreduc-
ibility, as something that just happens to be hard for us to predict (Silberstein 
& McGeever 1999: 186). And then there are some strong vs. weak emer-
gentists who find ontology inessential in this regard and rather juxtapose 
contingently epistemological (weak) and even-in-principle epistemological 
(strong) irreducibility (Chalmers 2006; cf. also Bedau 1997). Only by arm-
ing ourselves with the threefold distinction we become aware of all the most 
important emergence intuitions.
Each of the three senses is useful in some discursive contexts (although 
by this I do not mean to say that I accept, still less that I endorse all of those 
uses – let me just observe the fact that each sense has in actuality been found 
useful by some discussants in some language-games). To begin with, there 
are philosophical contexts where some debaters find it important to remind 
others that people do not create many of the features of the world just by 
talking about them, and that they thus cannot undo those features even if they 
managed to explain them in terms of their components. In that context it 
has been found useful to call features emergent in a purely ontological sense. 
The idea of emergence as even-in-principle irreducibility, in turn, is often 
used when a discussant wants to point out logical discontinuity between given 
two vocabularies. More specifically, in the philosophy of science, emergence 
in this sense has been referred to in defense of the legitimacy of some special 
science(s), the argument being that the science in question is needed because 
its objects are irreducible in the sense that they cannot (due to insurmount-
Searle (1992: 123) draws “between the reducibility of heat, color, solidity, etc., on the one 
hand, and the irreducibility of conscious states, on the other hand, does not reflect any distinc-
tion in the structure of reality, but a distinction in our definitional practices.”
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able differences between the conceptualizations used) be deduced from those 
of a more elementary science – not even in principle. And as to emergence in 
its purely epistemological sense, speaking of that kind of irreducibility is use-
ful in debates where we wish to admit our ignorance concerning how a given 
item might be understood through its components yet do not wish to com-
mit ourselves to a view as regards how “the Reality” must lie independently 
from that epistemological point. Referring to our present state of knowledge 
and cognitive limitations, emergence claims in that sense may be useful in, 
say, discussions concerning interesting research problems.
The reader will have noticed that I am not saying anything about what 
emergence is “really,” and what I hope comes across is that I do not believe 
there to be any one type of phenomena correctly named emergence. In any 
case, instead of trying to tell what emergence is, I merely try to tell what one 
can do with the term emergence. And a lot can certainly be said about how 
best to use a term in specific contexts, such as social theory.
3. Emergence in Social Theory
The prevailing inclination among social theorists these days seems to be to 
understand emergence in an ontological sense (e.g. Archer 1995; Lawson 
1997; Hodgson 2004; Elder-Vass 2010). The purest example of such an un-
derstanding can still be found in Bunge’s work, where emergence, as said, is 
completely unrelated to whether we understand it (Bunge 1979a: xiii; 2003: 
12); a Bungean society has emergent features simply because no single part of 
it possesses those features, but this has nothing to do with our understanding 
of its mechanisms (see Bunge 1979a: 243 ff.; 1997; 2003: 79–80). Of course, 
some ontological emergentists are not satisfied with this purest definition. 
For them, it is not ambitious, or interesting, enough: is Bunge not saying 
merely that every whole, simply because it is a whole, has emergent features? 
Even ontological and methodological individualists accept emergent features 
in that sense! (Kaidesoja 2009: 313.) Some have been more attracted by 
Bhaskar’s (1979; 1986) theory, for example,8 because of its deeper metaphys-
ics granting emergent entities sui generis causal powers of their own – powers 
springing from their essential natures. Dave Elder-Vass (2007; 2010), for 
instance, has recently defended a rather Bhaskarian conception of emergent 
social wholes, one which allows such wholes to have downward causal effects 
in their own right. (That certainly contradicts Bunge’s (1979: 39) views, be-
8 Of course, there are innumerable versions of ontological emergence around besides 
the Bungean and Bhaskarian “archetypes”; for example, Wimsatt’s (2007) emergentism is pre-
ferred by some social theorists (Kaidesoja 2009; Le Boutillier 2013). The details of all versions 
cannot be dealt with here, I discuss the matter only in general terms.
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cause he denies such “holistic” assumptions of downward causal effects, say-
ing they are but “actions of some components upon others … not the whole 
acting on its parts but some or even all of the remaining components of the 
system acting on the given component.”)
But there are also chiefly epistemological emergentists among social 
theorists – even some who admit social emergence only in the weakest, con-
tingently epistemological sense (e.g. Epstein & Axtell 1996; Hedström 2005: 
74–75). Their positions often come close to ontological individualism, but 
that is by no means necessary – Stephan Fuchs, for example, speaks of emer-
gence in a sense which seems rather contingently epistemological (see Fuchs 
2001: 199–200), yet his theory is anything but individualist.
And then there are still others who believe that, although ontologically 
there would not seem to be anything more to the social level features than in-
dividuals doing things, at least some social features are epistemically speaking 
even-in-principle irreducible (e.g. Kincaid 1997; Sawyer 2001). These theo-
rists seem like methodological collectivists, because their reasoning depends on 
the social features’ logical irreducibility (although some of them also draw 
(conception-dependent) ontological conclusions from it).
Now I am not saying that any of these uses of the term emergence in 
social theory is altogether unjustifiable (although taken together they imply 
that the term’s present versatility may be something of a problem). But all too 
often the fruitfulness of this terminology remains unclear, especially as re-
gards methodology: many theorists present the issue as if crucially important 
discoveries about the nature of social issues had been made, enthusiastically 
waving the banner of emergentism all over the place, but poorly articulate 
how exactly the use of that term is supposed to affect what social scientists 
actually do. Let us see if we can improve this situation.
To cut to the chase, I think the best use can be made of the term emer-
gence in social theory by putting the most weight on its empiricist, contin-
gently epistemological sense. This lets the relevant social scientific community 
to decide which features and combinations are (to be called) emergent. So 
I disagree with Holland (1998: 5) and others who say they “do not think 
emergence is an ‘eye-of-the-beholder’ phenomenon that goes away once it 
is understood”; to me, emergence is an eye-of-the-beholder phenomenon 
– although the “beholder” is a collective, a speech-community – and it does 
indeed disappear when sufficiently well understood: its scope changes over 
time due to changes in what the relevant community deems appropriate to 
call emergent. Thus I must also disagree with Spencer-Smith (1995: 120–
121), who finds it counterintuitive that X might be emergent at time t and 
then not be emergent at t + 1. I fail to see anything counterintuitive about 
that, because to me there is no point in assuming context-independent, “real” 
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emergence. To put it bluntly, I think there are emergents only insofar as people 
consider something emergent.
However, I am not saying we should accept the Millian or Hempelian 
understanding of emergence as such. Most crucially, I do not believe that 
(social) scientific work comes down to trying to subsume events under cover-
ing or strict laws from which explanations could be deduced. I do not share 
that ideal of deduction with older empiricists, and even most reductionists 
today are not trying to subsume covering laws under more covering laws but 
are rather after only what Wilson (1999: 56–60) calls “consilience” – con-
necting facts and theories across different disciplines, weaving a coherent web 
of explanations and predictions, which certainly involves as strict laws and 
principles as possible, but not ones that could be deductively subsumed under 
one another. In fact, I believe the pragmatist classic John Dewey had it right 
when he suggested that there are no laws completely beyond exception: even 
the laws of physics are in the end but statistical, probabilistic generalizations; 
laws are empirical regularities found in the frequencies of events, regularities 
which we may usefully conceptualize as mechanisms of events because they al-
low us to predict the likelihood of given events in some specific circumstances 
(Dewey [1929] 1988: 164–167, 198–199).
Indeed, the term mechanisms is preferred over laws today, at least in 
the human sciences and probably in all special sciences (e.g. Bunge 1997; 
Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000; Delehanty 2004; Hedström & Yliko-
ski 2010).9 And the term emergence could be used to characterize features 
whose mechanisms the appropriate scientific community today considers so 
poorly understood in terms of their component factors (the whatever things, 
actions, events, processes, etc. are conceived as the relevant constituents of 
the feature) that they cannot currently claim to have a good grasp of those 
mechanisms. A good grasp of mechanism, in turn, would not mean being 
able to deduce the phenomenon but rather just having an explanation of it in 
terms of its component factors such that (the bulk of ) the relevant scientific 
community is content with. (An explanation like that surely involves some 
capacity to predict the phenomenon in question, too, but only its approxi-
mate likelihood in given circumstances.)
I know that many philosophers of science, even some social epistemolo-
gists, are squeamish about this idea because they fear it means turning the 
scientific community into “a guild” whose rulings would have “no higher 
9 Today mechanisms are usually understood in some ontologically realist sense mark-
edly different from Dewey’s pragmatist, instrumentalist sense, but I do not think the issue is 
decided in favor of realist interpretations, and we can learn a lot from Dewey’s writings in this 
regard, too. A detailed presentation of my own view of mechanisms is left for another occasion, 
but it is a pragmatist, empiricist, instrumentalist view, which takes concepts not as revelations 
of Reality but as tools for explaining regularities of events.
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court of appeal” (Fuller 2003: 475). But yes, I shun conceiving myself as a 
Philosopher Judge of the Supreme Court of Science, and so I admit believing 
that in the end we must allow scientists (the community engaged in scientific 
practices) to decide what is scientific; that goes for methods and facts, includ-
ing emergents and resultants, as well as for the limits of the community itself 
and its practices (also Rouse 2003: 467–468; Kivinen & Piiroinen 2006: 
312–315). What a philosopher can do is make conceptual suggestions for 
scientists to consider – suggestions that might help clarify something and 
thereby contribute positively.
Speaking of conceptual suggestions, am I then urging that social theo-
rists reconsider their present ways of speaking of emergent irreducibility and 
give up using it in any chiefly ontological or even-in-principle sense? In a 
word, yes. Of course, we cannot pick one sense of a term and simply decide 
to use it in that sense from now on. Language leads a life of its own, and it 
seems unlikely that purely ontological and even-in-principle senses will soon 
be dropping from amongst the uses of the term emergence. But a philoso-
pher may still take the floor to object to the current state of affairs. This may 
mean objecting to a very broad linguistic framework, but there is no harm 
in that. (In this regard one can take inspiration from Wilfrid Sellars ([1956] 
1997: §42) who challenged the whole language-game of “common sense,” 
suggesting “a rejection (in some sense) of this very framework itself, in favor 
of another built around different, if not unrelated, categories.” Obviously this 
did not imply “a proposal to brain-wash existing populations and train them 
to speak differently” – it was just a case of philosopher making a stand against 
certain linguistic practices. (Cf. also Rorty 1998: 44–45.))
4. What Use is Emergence?
As to the arguments for my view, let me begin with a positive one in favor of 
making use of emergence mainly in the sense of contingently epistemological 
irreducibility; later, in the next section, I will contemplate the main nega-
tive sides of using it in one of the other two principal senses involved in the 
concept.
The main useful discursive function of claims that something is pres-
ently epistemically irreducible is, I suggest, guiding researchers toward what 
are presently considered interesting complex research objects in the field. It is like 
saying: “This here is caused by a mechanism about which we do not have ex-
haustive knowledge yet, so perhaps we should do some research on it!”10 Seen 
10 Then why not just say that and drop the term emergent, you ask? Indeed, why not; 
no single word is indispensable – there are always alternative ways to say things.
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that way, an emergence claim can pick out social scientific research problems 
considered important and challenging (whereas the features we tend not to 
call emergent will tacitly be presumed sufficiently well understood or other-
wise uninteresting).
Notice that this means, among other things, that emergence is not an 
explanatory word – the term by itself explains nothing. It is an explanation-
related word, however, because it guides the members of the speech-com-
munity in search of interesting features wanting explanation. Emergent 
phenomena seem mysterious, but only in the sense that more investigations 
are needed in order to increase our understanding of them (see also Holland 
1998: 2). So emergence as I understand it – as opposed to emergence in 
the sense of even-in-principle irreducibility – encourages attempts to reduce 
emergent features to their components. And while such attempts may also be 
encouraged by ontological emergentists, contingently epistemological emer-
gence differs from the purely ontological sense in that it acknowledges our 
present epistemic bafflement concerning the object, the “shroud of mystery” 
covering it, and alludes to that bafflement as warrant for further research. 
Emergence claims in purely ontological senses, in contrast, detached from 
epistemic concerns as they are, do not as such imply that we should take ac-
tions toward or try to understand the objects in question – that is not a part 
of their function.
This, then, is the positive argument for putting the most weight on the 
contingently epistemological intuition of emergence in the discursive context 
of methodological social theory: it is the one sense in which the term can be 
used in pinpointing interesting, baffling problems of social scientific impor-
tance, by the same token encouraging research into them and leaving the 
door open for future knowledge perhaps enabling us to remove the present 
bafflement by way of reducing the object into (finding its mechanisms from) 
its simpler component factors.
The other two main intuitions of emergence fail to serve this positive 
function, and may actually be more harmful than useful in methodology. 
Of course, that does not mean they are useless in social theory, period: it 
cannot be doubted that mainly ontological and even-in-principle senses of 
emergence can be useful at least in the context of social theory for social theory’s 
sake. Most crucially, when theoretical collectivists wage their battles against 
individualists, they may make use of the term emergence against both chiefly 
ontological individualists, whose principal claim is that social features have 
no real existence of their own in addition to all the individual activities that 
go (and have gone) into them, and individualists of the “at-least-in-principle” 
bent who maintain that it must be possible, at least in principle, to explain 
any social feature in terms of individuals and their beliefs. (The two kinds of 
individualism – just like ontological and even-in-principle emergentism – are 
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often confused with each other or tangled together, but can and should be 
kept separate (Udehn 2001: 350–351).)11
So an important caveat must be added: in the theoretical struggles 
against individualism, the term emergence can be used as a weapon in its 
purely ontological or even-in-principle sense. However, those battles against 
individualism are not likely to be resolved: they are indeed a paradigm case 
of social theory for social theory’s sake – of that endless intellectual game 
almost completely devoid of practical social scientific significance (although 
of course hailed as crucially important in that regard by many of its partici-
pants). And although I am quite sure that there will always be social theory 
for social theory’s sake, and may even admit that there is some intrinsic value 
to it – same kind of value as there is in art or a good game of chess – I person-
ally encourage putting more weight on the methodologically-oriented social 
theory, which may actually help improve social scientific practices, and in 
that discursive context emergence in its ontological and even-in-principle 
senses is more harmful than useful. Let us see why.
5. Problems with Even-in-principle and 
Purely Ontological Irreducibility
As claims of purely ontological emergence as such do not suggest any research 
actions to be taken, they tend to fare badly in terms of discursive usefulness in 
methodological social theory. Of course, ontological emergentists do in fact 
want to suggest research actions to be taken and some of them have made 
noteworthy methodological contributions, too (e.g. Bunge 1997; Wimsatt 
2007), but I have to say those methodological contributions do not really fol-
low from the ontological use of the term emergence. All the methodological 
advice they want to give could just as well be offered from an instrumentalist 
standpoint, presenting the strata or hierarchy of structures and properties as 
but more or less useful conceptual devices. Or, perhaps, it does not even mat-
ter whether we use level terminology at all: instead of levels, which tend to 
draw a picture of collective being somehow above, on top of, and in addition 
to, people, we could just as well speak of wider and narrower scopes, fields, or 
networks of agents, thinking of micro terminology as focusing into specific 
11 A purely ontological individualist may admit that social features are completely un-
predictable due to their complexity, but claims that they consist of nothing but people doing 
(and having done) and believing things. Meanwhile, an at-least-in-principle epistemological 
individualist may admit that social features are ontologically sui generis, but insists that they 
must still be in principle reducible to individuals epistemologically speaking (perhaps because 
the world is completely determined and so even sui generis features are predictable for an 
archangel).
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details, and macro as abstractions over larger landscapes of society. In fact, 
one of the dangers that I see with the idea of ontologically emergent levels 
is precisely that it may discourage instrumentalist interpretations and hori-
zontal metaphors in social sciences, insisting as it does that the micro–macro 
difference is not a matter of size or different heuristic tools but of ontologi-
cally distinct sui generis strata of autonomously powerful entities (e.g. Archer 
1995: 8 ff., 57 ff.).
A related problem, against which Dewey & Bentley [1949] (Dewey 
1991: 121) warned, is that speaking of ontological emergence even in some 
of its more innocent senses which profess to maintain naturalness, in fact 
stealthily turns emergents into something different and distinct from their 
natural components, into something almost “unnatural” because sui generis, 
capable of interacting with and opposing its components. And that just cre-
ates unnecessary metaphysical mystification. In social theory, too, what Peter 
Hedström (2005: 69) for instance finds is an “unfortunate tendency … to 
treat social reality as if it were stratified into different ontological levels that 
can be causally analyzed independently of each other”, just “obscures rather 
than clarifies, and typically leads to rather superficial causal accounts and 
explanations.”
A deeper problem, I should point out, may be involved in the very on-
tologizing vein of thinking common to ontological emergentists and indi-
vidualists alike – the idea that we first need to lay down a specific kind of 
ontological theory in order to start off on the right foot methodologically 
(Bhaskar 1979; Searle 1995). I think that that is ill-advised (see also Rorty 
1998: Ch. 3; Pleasants 1999; Kivinen & Piiroinen 2006; Van Bouwel & We-
ber 2008). Even if not taking sides as regards whether ontological emergen-
tists are “right” or “wrong” in the sense that ontological reductionists would 
accordingly be wrong or right in their claim that objects are ontologically re-
ducible independently from what anybody knows about them, I am tempted 
to say that all enthusiastic ontologists are setting and answering a nonsensical 
and thus useless question, the question of how the world looks outside all 
points of view or from a “God’s eye view.” This is due to their representa-
tionalist idea of the mind being a mirror of the world (Rorty 1979), or what 
Dewey [1929] (1988: 19) called the Spectator Theory of knowledge, and 
their (implicit or explicit) Picture Theory of language – the conviction that 
true claims must correctly present ontologically real referents “out there.” 
For that is just about the only explanation for the ontological emergentist 
assumption that since there are both terms X and Y referring to the same part 
of the space-time, and their meanings are not identical, we should conclude 
that X and Y refer to different levels of reality. But for those of us suspicious of 
the idea that mind/language–world relationship is best captured in terms of 
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visual metaphors, this is ample reason for abandoning the idea of ontological 
stratification (Heil 2003).
In any case, methodologically speaking again, even if we assume that 
ontological emergence implies no unnecessary mysteries or reification – even 
at its best, that is – the idea of ontological emergence is just, in a word, trivial, 
because methodologically inconsequential. As a paradigm example of such 
harmlessly trivial idea of emergence, the Bungean emergence must not be 
“equated with ignorance of the mechanism resulting in the assembly of new 
things from their constituents or their precursors” (Mahner & Bunge 2007: 
29), and hence will not guide us in methodology.
Yet that sort of inconsequentiality is more than can be said of emergence 
in the sense of even-in-principle irreducibility, which means saying that it is 
absolutely impossible to reduce the emergent phenomena to their compo-
nents. That claim is something we can scarcely have any use for in science: 
categorically denying the possibility of reduction beforehand, even-in-princi-
ple irreducibility exemplifies overly pessimistic, antiscientific attitude. I know 
this is a bit of an ideological statement, but I think scientists should always 
be eager to try and understand complex wholes by breaking them into pieces 
and seeing how those pieces work together in constituting the wholes at issue; 
attempts to reduce complex objects are at the very core of scientific method-
ology. (See Hempel and Oppenheim 1948: 149–152; Wilson 1999: 55–60; 
also Dennett 2005: 3–7.) For what else a claim of even-in-principle irreduci-
bility, forbidding attempts to reduce the object in question to its components 
– pretending perhaps that the magic word emergent is all the explanation we 
need – is but a way of declaring the object taboo?
When human consciousness, for instance, is dubbed emergent in the 
even-in-principle irreducibility sense, those emergentists are claiming, in ef-
fect, that consciousness is an insoluble mystery, which “they themselves un-
derstand … a little bit – just well enough to be able to conclude that it 
couldn’t be solved by any mechanistic account” (Dennett 2005: 5). And that, 
as Daniel Dennett for instance has always been eager to point out, is just 
utterly unscientific. Of course, even scientists may sometimes come to con-
clude that certain features very likely cannot be well understood through 
their given components – may even be tempted to utter the words “not even 
in principle” – but that is not a conclusion we wish to encourage in science. 
Rather, we always want to leave the door open for future reductions.
In practice, also many even-in-principle irreducibility emergentists, like 
Popper, do admit that scientists “have to welcome reductionism as a method”; 
but they nevertheless insist that their emergentism is crucial in the philosophy 
of science, and so Popper goes on to reproach reductionists for the wish of 
capturing the ultimate essence of Reality (the most fundamental micro-struc-
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ture) (Popper 1974: 259–260; cf. also Clayton 2006: 1). Fair enough, I also 
want to avoid essentialism, and in fact reduction-ism, too; I think a good 
point is made by those ontological emergentists who say we do not need 
to embrace reductionism (as a sort of fundamentalist principle according to 
which reduction is always the way to go), and that we may still admit that 
striving for singular reductions is an essential part of scientific work (Mahner 
& Bunge 1997: 114–116; Hodgson 2004: 29). I join those emergentists in 
not accepting reductionism as a fundamental methodological principle yet 
nevertheless encouraging scientists to strive for singular reductions in given 
cases – and leaving the door open for future reductions. In fact, pace Popper, 
I think the right way to battle dogmatic philosophical ideologies like at-least-
in-principle reductionist individualism is not embracing another dogmatic 
philosophical ideology like even-in-principle irreducibility emergentism, but 
rejecting all such –isms in the philosophy of (social) science and concentrat-
ing instead on the fine-tuning or methodological grinding of the conceptual 
tools used in scientific practices.
Aside from such humble methodological fine-tuning there is probably 
little a philosopher can do to help research practices. But at least we should 
stop harassing or blocking research, and that means, among other things, 
preferring the contingently epistemological sense of emergence over the even-
in-principle irreducibility sense in social theory – for the former actually en-
courages research, while the latter tries to step in its way.
6. Final Words
In this paper, an attempt has been made to say something of substance about 
the uses of the term emergence in the context of methodological social theory. 
Adopting a pragmatist standpoint, I evaluated the usefulness of the different 
main senses or intuitions of emergence; so instead of asking, what is (the 
ultimate nature of ) social emergence, I asked, what are the main functions 
of calling social phenomena emergent? Hopefully this discussion has helped 
opening up new, fresh viewpoints on this issue.
I abstracted three major intuitions of emergence: contingently epistemo-
logical irreducibility, even-in-principle irreducibility, and purely ontological 
(i.e., conceptualization-independent) irreducibility. The main problem we 
found with even-in-principle irreducibility sense of emergence was that it is 
unscientific, discouraging scientists’ thirst for explanation through reduction; 
at worst, it may even be used as a sort of explanatory magic word, suppos-
edly providing all the explanation needed. The purely ontological intuition of 
emergence avoids that problem, but insofar as emergence is thereby detached 
from epistemological concerns it becomes rather unhelpful in methodologi-
cal discussions. Moreover, social scientists should not be expected to achieve 
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much by chanting that a structure is ontologically sui generis no matter what 
anybody knows about it; and at worst, it may just lure us into a host of un-
necessary metaphysics.
This leaves us with the contingently epistemological sense of emergence, 
which points to complex issues we presently do not know how to explain and 
predict in a satisfactory manner on the basis of knowledge of their compo-
nents alone; and that sense of emergence can be of some use in methodologi-
cal social theory. It can be used in guiding research activities: its reference to 
the current mystery surrounding the phenomenon in question is useful as 
an encouragement and legitimization of research on the issue. So I argued 
that the most weight should be put on this positively explanation-related 
sense – as opposed to the other, should we say, explanation-independent and 
explanation-frustrating senses.
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